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LATIN AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE 
Outlines of a B u n h i a n  Semantics 
INTRODUCTION 
Originally, in this paper I wished to present a complete formal semantic system 
constructed for a fragment of Latin in line with the logico-semantic tenets of Jean 
Buridan. By the presentation of this semantic system I hoped to show that Buridan's 
semantic ideas, if given the appropriate technical formulations, can provide us with a 
genuine alternative way of construing the relationships between language, thought 
and reality, w e t h y  of our serious consideration when thinking of matters of 
semantics. (Which explains the intentionally provocative tit1e.l) Though I still believe 
that the task is aEter all not impossible, work on the technical details of this project 
convinced me that it cannot be properly completed within the confines of a single 
research paper. The intuitively quite simple and transparent ideas of Buridan's 
semantic theory, when one tries to convert them into strict syntactic and model 
theoretical formulations, turn out to "branch" into several, rather complicated formal 
clauses, resulting in an extremely complex, unperspicuous system. 
This fact, however, in itself gives rise to a number of interesting questions. Are 
these complications inevitable? Are they rooted in the difference between Buridan's 
mediaeval and our modem standards of what a complete semantic theory should 
look like? Or do they represent rather the inherent complexity of natural, as 
opposed to formal languages? Or do they, perhaps, have something to do with 
Buridan's particularistic approach to logic in general, and his explicit admission of an 
infinity of fxst principIes?2 
These and similar questions will crop up inevitably even after the subsequent 
"rudiment* presentation, reflection on which, I hope, may promote our 
understanding not only of Buridan's semantic ideas, but perhaps also of the nature 
of the semantic enterprise in general. 
I begin the discussion by presenting the syntactic construction of a rather 
restricted, but philosophically interesting fragment of Latin. In contrast with 
Montague's approach, the semantic theory will be defrned for this fragment, without 
the use of a formal language mediating between natural language sentences and 
their interpretation. Syntactic ambiguities will be taken care of by analyses supplied 
I 
The allusion in the title is to Richard Montague's "English as a Formal Language", in: R Montague: Pmal Phibsophy, Yale University Press, New Hawn-London, 1W4. 
"(1) Non autem est unicum principium primum et indemonstrabile, sed sunt plum (2) Immo non sunt 
conclusiones demonstrabiles multo p l u m  quam principia indemonstrabilia.(3) Ideo , infinita sunt talia 
principia, quia infinitae sunt conclusions demonstrabiles." loluvurir B U M  Lectura & Summa 
Logicue (henceforth SL), unpublished edition by H. Hubien. Tracatus Octavus: De Demonstrationibus, 
c.5, 2. I am indebted to Professor Hubien for authorizing me to use his invaluable edition, and to 
CI-,L,. D-..A c,, ....4--..it _ _ _ _ _ _ _  1-2 -___ --&L n--c _ _ _ _ _  TT.-L:--'- I -__ 
by the syntactic construction. The semantic theory, however, will not be built directly 
on the syntactic construction, because of Buridan's peculiar theory of meaning in 
terms of a mental language. It is notably at this point that the unwieldy complexity of 
formulations will raise its ugly head, so, by way of a compromise, I will supply only 
an incomplete characterization of Buridan's "Mentalese" in a model theoretical 
framework. On this incomplete basis I will be able only to indicate how further 
treatment of the most important properties of terms: sigmfication, connotation, 
supposition, appellation and ampliation, and the defdtion of truth and consequence 
would look in a complete system. I shall close my discussion with some illustrations 
of the workings of the system, reflecting on its philosophical and methodological 
implications. 
Since the primary purpose of a logical semantic theory is to defrne logical 
consequence in terms of the truth values of propositions in different interpretations, 
the corresponding syntactic theory is primarily concerned with the formation rules of 
propositions, determining the ways propositions are built up from their components. 
In modern logical systems a distinction is usually drawn between atomic and 
molecular formulae (i.e., strings of signs representing natural language sentences 
expressing propositions). Atomic formulae are formulae that are not made up from 
other formulae, while molecular formulae are those which are made up from other 
formulae by means of logical connectives that take formulae in their arguments to 
produce further formulae. 
In Buridan's syntactic theory a somewhat similar distinction can be found 
between categorical and hypothetical propositions. Categorical propositions do not 
contain other propositions as their components, while hypothetid propositions are 
those formed from other propositions by means of logical connectives? 
However, despite this analogy, Buridan's categoricals are by no means 
syntactically as simple as the atomic formulae of the modern theories. Categorical 
propositions consist of a copula, a subject and a predicate term, possibly determined 
by signa qumtitatis, that is, determiners. Obvious counterexamples to this "canonical 
form", containing verbs as their predicates, are explained away in Buridan's theory 
by resolving the verb into copula and participle! Accordingly, atomic formulae of 
Which, however, does not mean that a hypothetical p rop i t ion  actually contains categorical 
pmpositions as its parts. As Buridan explains: Yidetur ergo mihi quod quando dicitur "pmpositio 
hypothetica est quae habet duas propositiones categorim", hoc, pmprie loquendo, non est verum, sed 
ad istum sensum quod p m p i t i o  hypothetica continet duo praedicata et duo subjecta et duas copulas, 
et quad utrumque illorum praedicatorum mediante una illarum mpularum dicitur de uno illorum 
subjectorum; scd congregatum ex uno praedicato et uno subject0 et  sua copula non est una propitio, 
sed est cars unius txopositionis, licet tab MX, si esset separatim sumpta, esset bene una categoria." SL, 
$r&atL primus: b e  Pmpitionibus, c.3,2. 
... notandum at ... quod verbum non est praedicatum pmprie loquendo, sed est copula praedicati cum 
subject0 vel implicans in se simul copulam et praedicatum. Nam hoc vehum ' s t '  tertium adjacens a t  
copula et quod scquitur a t  praedicatum. W hoc verburn 'at' secundum adjacens, ut cum dim 'homo 
tst', vel etiam quodlibet aliud verburn, implicat in se coputam cum praedicato vel cum parte principaliori 
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standard quantification theory containing a relational predicate parameter 
correspond to categoricals with a complex term having one or more parts in an 
oblique case. For example, the sentence: "Plato debet Socrati Brunellum" in its 
canonical form would look like: "Plato est debens Socrati Brunellum", where the 
subject, 'Plato', is joined by the copula, 'est', to the complex term "debens Socrati 
Brunellum". 
As this example also shows, the potential complexity of a categorical proposition 
is due to the potential complexity of its terms, which, linguistically, can be just any 
noun-phrases that may occur in subject or predicate positions: singular or common 
nouns (with or without determiners), pronouns, adjectives, participles: common 
nouns determined by adjectives, by possessives (i.e., possessive pronouns or terms in 
the genitive case), by participles (along with their oblique complements) or by 
relative clauses, infinitives, accusative with X i t i v e  constructions and complex 
terms obtained from the above by Boolean operations, i.e., negation, conjunction 
and disjunction. 
In view of this enormous potential complexity, one can easily see how ill- 
conceived it is to think of the theory of categoricals as an insignificant, minor 
fragment of logical theory. Indeed, in order to obtain a tractable theory, in this paper 
I shall consider only a fragment of Buridan's theory of categorical propositions. 
Accordingly, I will not deal with Buridan's propositional logic (which, as far as I 
can judge, would only present the historically-minded reader with just another nil- 
novi-su b-sole-experience anyway) .6 
Again, I will not deal with pronouns, the analysis of which is partly related to the 
logic of hypotheticals, and which form a separate issue in Buridan's semantics under 
the heading: de suppositione relativomm? I will, however, consider some uses of 
relative pronouns in forming relative clauses to explain a peculiar property of terms 
in what modern philosophers would call intensional contexts, namely ampliation. 
To fully consider intensional phenomena in Buridan's semantics we would need 
praedicati; ideo ad explicandum subjectum, praedicatum et  copulam, tale verbum debet resolvi in hoc 
verbum ' a t '  tertium adjacens, si p r o p i t i o  sit de inesse et  d e  praesenti, e t  in participium illius verbi, ut 
'homo currit' id est 'homo est currens', similiter 'homo est' id est 'homo est ens'. SL, Tractatus primus: 
QAdjectives and participles can be subjects only when they are "substantivated in the neutral gender". 
Cf. e.g.: " ... quare omne subjicibile est praedicabile e t  non e converso. Ad quod potest responderi 
notando primo quod in hac tota parte nihil intendimus d e  subjectione vel praedicatione m u m  
materialiter sumptarum, sed significative. Eit tunc d im primo d e  illis adjectivis non substantivatis in 
neutro genere quod secundum grammaticum non possunt reddere suppositum verbo, ideo etiam non 
possunt esse subjecta propi t ionum,  propter defectum conpi ta t is ;  sed verbo jam habente suppositum, 
adjectiva possunt apponi ad designandum quid adjaceat subjecto vel ei pro quo subjectum supponit. 
Tamen =rum est quod adjectivum substantivatum in neutro genere potest esse subjectum, quia re- 
solvitur in substantivum et adjectivum, ut 'album' id a t  'res alba'." SL, Tractatus Quartus: De ' For excellent presentations and evaluations of Buridan's p r o p i t i o n a l  logic from a modem point of 
view see e.g.: Hubien, H.: 'bgiciens mddidvaux et  logique d'aujourd'hui', Revue Philosophique de 
Lowain, 75, pp. 219-232,19?7 and EA. Moody. Truth and Consequence in Medieval b g i c ,  Amsterdam, 
'9gr some formal treatment of the topic see, however, my "General Terms in Their Referring 
Function", in G. Klima: Ars Am'um: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modem, Budapest, 
1988. 
e Propositionibus, c.3, 2. 
uppositionibus, c.2. 2. 
tenses. However, to simplifv matters, for illustrative purposes in this fragment I will 
deal only with the present, perfect and future forms of the copula in the third person 
singular, namely 'est', 'fuit' and 'erit' - the tenses mostly occurring in Buridan's ex- 
amples as well. 
On the part of the noun phrases in this framework I am also going to leave 
several possible constructions aside. However, I am going to deal in more detail with 
complex terms containing one or more oblique terms as their parts. So in the 
fragment to be constructed here we shall need cases. 
On the other hand, due to the special difficulties they present, I am also going to 
disregard plurals. Consequently, since according to Buridan "subjectum copulatum 
aequivalet subjecto pluralis numeri in reddendo suppositum verbo", I shall have to 
omit conjunctive terms as well! 
As we are soon to see, even with so many omissions, a relatively rich, and 
philosophically interesting fragment of Lath can be constructed. However, since the 
main purpose of this construction is not to give a description of a significant part of 
the Latin language, but to illustrate the theoretical power of Buridan's semantic 
ideas, we can afford to base this construction on a very limited vocabulary. As a 
matter of fact, this squares well both with Montague's method, and with Buridan's 
practice in selecting his examples and sophismafa. 
VOCABULQRY (voc) 
In the subsequent clauses: 
g E {mas, fem, ne} = GENDER and c E { nom, acc, gen, dat, abl} = CASE, indicating 
the appropriate gender and case of the lexical item indexed by them. 
PN (proper nouns): = { Socrates- Plato- Brunellus- Favellus-} 
CN (common nouns): = {homo- equ- animal, C a n i h  visus- albedh} 
Adj (adjectives): = { caecusgc, albusc} 
Prtc (participles): = { mortuus, vidensgcsco debensScpat+, habens,,, ens,} 
Sig (signa quantitatis, determiners): = { quidam, omnis,} 
Conj (conjunctiones): = {vel, non} 
RP (relative pronoun): = { quod,} 
Cop (copula): = { est, fuit, erit} 
sets: 
VOC: = PNU CN UAdj U Prtc USig U Conj URPUCop 
In an obvious manner, an indexed term stands for just the same term in the 
appropriate case and gender, e.g., " O m ~ e m m  animal,,, quidammge,, homowgen 
videnSIKnom quidam,,, albedotern" = "omne animal cuiusdam hominis videns 
quamdam albedinem". The case indices of participles after the commas indicate the 
required cases of their complements, i.e., terms with which they can be construed. 
The whole vocabulary of our fragment, then, is the union of the above-defmed 
* "Quia subjectum copulatum aequivalet subjecto pluralis numeri in reddendo suppositum verbo; ideo 
oportet verbum esse pluralis numeri." SL Tarctatus Quartus: De Suppositionibus, c.2, 6. For a 
systematic account of the semantics of conjunctive terms and their relationships with supposition theory, 
however, see my "Approaching Natural Language via Mediaeval Logic", in: J. Bernard-J. Kelemen: 
Zeichen, Denken, Praxis, Institut fur Sozio-Semiotische Studien, Vienna, 1990. 
f 
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Indexed names of sets of expressions will serve to indicate their subsets containing 
just the appropriate indexed items. For example: Ad j~~m={caeC~Mm,  al- 
bh,,} = {caecum, album}. (Correspondingly, indexed metavariables in the 
subsequent clauses range over terms in the appropriate genders and cases: if n 
ranges over common nouns, then nmusco e.g., ranges over only common nouns of 
masculine gender in the accusative case.) Brackets in the following clauses indicate 
that the parts of speech they enclose are optional, i.e., they may or may not be 
present in forming the appropriate expression. For example, in the clause: if k E  Sig 
and t,E CN, then "[~e.] k"€TRMgo the brackets indicate that the signum s may, but 
need not be concatenated with a common noun to form a term, and so, e.g. both 
'homo' and "quidam homo" are terms. (The gender and case indices indicate that 
e.g. "quemdam hominem" and "quamdam albedinem" would also be terms by this 
clause. Double quotation marks are used as quasi-quotes, indicating the operation of 
concatenation. Simple expressions of our fragment are mentioned by enclosing them 
in single quotation marks.) Bracketed indices of metavariables ranging over 
participles indicate that these metavariables range both over participles that do and 
those that do not require complements in specified cases: pmuge4cll[~l, e.g. has as its 
range of values: {mortui, videntis, debexitism, habentis, entis}. The optional 
occurrence of the appropriate complements in a phrase is, of course, conditioned by 
the presence of the participle requiring them: such complements occur in a phrase 
only if the participle requiring them occurs. Generally, bracketed Occurrences of a 
phrase enclosed in the same pair of outer brackets with another expression below 
are conditioned by the Occurrence of the expression with which they are bracketed 
together. The pairs of sub-strings enclosed by < > < >  may be replaced by one 
another (i.e. they may occur also in the reverse order). 
TERMS W) 
"non t" E TRM, where if t E ITRM, then also "non t" E ITRM 
If bEITRM and GESig, then 
IsF &" E TRM, 
If tlpm E "d, G m E  TRM, COPE COP and k m  E RP, then 
" t l p m  q p o m  cop %m"ETRMpm 
If qmmERP, COPECOP and &,€TIM, then 
"q-m cop tmm" E ITRMnenom 
If t&, tG€ITRM, then 
"tl, vel t28c(l E ITRM, 
For semantic purposes we shall have to distinguish between categorematic (CAT) 
and syncategorematic terms (SYNC): 
SYNC: = SigU Cop U Cog; CAT =TRM U RP U Adj U Prtc 
terms: 
ABTR = {vism,,-, albedh}; CONCR = CAT-ABTR 




If tl, t2E TRM,, and cop€ Cop, then 
"tl [non] cop t2" E PROP 
If pE  PROP, then "non p" € PROP 
EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION 
Since the clauses above are rather complicated, I think it is worth providing some 
examples to illustrate how they are supposed to work. Through these examples we 
can also assess the adequacy of these rules and the extent of the fragment of Latin 
they cover. 
Clauses (1) and (2) take care of simple as well as complex terms formed with 
adjectives and participles substantivated in the neutral gender, i.e., in their capacity 
of forming standalone terms without attaching to nouns as their adjuncts (sicut 
deteiminatio ad deteminabile). So, e.g., 'album' in itself is a term, indeed, an 
indefinite term (ITRM), i.e., a term not determined to some defrnte quantity by 
some signum, by clause (1). Similarly, "videns hominem", "habentis omnem equum", 
or "debentem &dam homini quemdam equum" are all indefinite terms by clause 
(2), while they would become definite terms by p r e f b g  them with a signum of the 
appropriate case and gender as is prescribed by clause (7). 
Note here that, for semantic reasons, Buridan himself does not regard signa 
quantitaiis as parts of terms (in particular, of subject terms) of propositions? It is 
Cf.: "Sed dc rignis affhmativis, ut 'omnis', 'quilibet', quare non possunt ita bene esse partes 
subjcctorum sicut praedicatorum? Potest dici quod signum distnbutivum p i t u m  a parte praedicati 
nihil opcratur super copulam vel super subjectum, ideo totalitcr dicitur pertinere ad praedicatum. Sed 
positum a partc subjecti operatur super copulam ct super praedicatum, confundendo ipum, licet non 
distributive, ideo nec ponitur essc pars subjecti nec pars praedicati, sed ponitur tamquam condicio 
totalis propositionis. Sed tunc videtur difficilius de sign0 particulari: quia nihil operatur super copulam 
vel super praedicatum si ponatur a parte subjecti, proptcr quod videtur quod ita bene deberet poni pars 
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quite harmless, however, to treat them in this way in the syntactic theory, and 
renders much easier the formulation of recursive clauses. 
Another feature of these clauses worth noticing is their making complex terms 
inherit the case and gender of their core-terms. This is important again from the 
point of view of the recursive applicability of these clauses. This feature of these 
rules makes their application possible also to the result of their previous 
applications. For example, by clauses (1) and (7) "omne album" is a term not only in 
the nominative, but also in the accusative case. So this term can occur as the 
complement in the accusative case required by 'videns', whence, by clause (2) , 
"videns omne album" will also be a term. 
Indeed, "videns omne album" may itself also be in the accusative case (provided 
'videns' is in the accusative), whence it may be the complement of 'videns' again, and 
so "videns videns omne album" will also be a term. The same kind of construction 
can be repeated an unlimited number of times>* 
On the other hand, since the case of a complex term depends on the case of its 
core, if this core is, say, in the dative, as in "videnti videns album", then this cannot be 
the complement of %dens' again. It can, however, be the complement of 'debens', as 
in "debens videnti videns album omne videns album" (possibly referring to something 
that owes everything that sees a white thing to something that sees something that 
sees a white thing, which may be complicated but after all not impossible). 
Clause (2) also allows for different word order, which has semantic significance in 
Buridan's theory. As we shall see, for example, "debens Socrati equum" and "equum 
Socrati debens" need not have the same semantic value. 
Note here that by clause (7) we would not be able to obtain e.g. "quemdam 
~~ ~~ 
subjecti, sicut esset pars praedicati si poneretur a parte praedicati. Ad hoc possunt dari multae 
responsiones. Prima est quod signum particulare omnino frustra ponitur in propitione, sive a parte 
subjecti sive a parte praedicati, prout ista regula concederetur, scilicet quod indefinita et particularis 
aequipollent gratia formae, quia sic omnino nihil mutatur de summa propter additionem vel 
subtractionem signi; ideo nec debet reputari pan subjecti nec pars praedicati, nec aliqua condicio 
propitionis nisi frustratorie apposita. Et ego ostendo quod illud signum particulare, etiam positum a 
parte praedicati, non sit pars praedicati. Quia istae duae gratia formae aequipollent 'B est A' et 'B est 
aliquod A ideo quaecumque contradicit uni contradicit alteri; modo constat quod ista 'nullum B est A' 
contradicit primae; ergo similiter contradicit secundae, et tamen non contradiceret t i  si iste terminus 
'aliquod' esset pars praedicati, quia jam non essent de eodem subjecto et eodem praedicato, quod tamen 
requiritur ad contradictionem formalem. Ideo videtur mihi quod talis dictio p i t a  sive in subjecto sive 
in praedicato non debet dici pars subjecti nec pars praedicati; vel si ponatur esse pars praedicati, ita 
debet poni pars subjecti, sed tamen pars frustratorie apposita, quia ea ablata nihil mutaretur de summa. 
Sed alio modo signum particulare ponitur aliquando in propitione, vel etiam signum universale, ad 
determinandum indefinitam, scilicet signum universale ad designandum quod praedicatum verificatur de 
subjecto pro omni ejus supposito et particulare ad designandum quod veritas sit pro aliquo et non pro 
omni, vel saltem quod veritas sit nota pro aliquo et non sit nota pro omni; et p rop i t io  indefinita se 
habet ad hoc indifferenter. Unde sic proprie sumendo signum particulare leges bene ponunt 
differemtiam inter propitionem particularem et indefinitam, et saepius per indefinitam intelligunt uni- 
versalem, et non particularem. Et isto modo signum universale et particulare non deserviunt ad 
subjiciendum, sed ad designandum quantitatem propositionis quando ponuntur a parte subjecti." SL, T'$actatus Quartus: De Suppositionibus, c.2,2. 
To be sure, in real Latin, as in any human language, there should probably be some limit on the 
repeatability of this construction. But this may concern the limited short-term memory capacity of 
human language users, which may have to do rather with pragmatics than syntax. Anyway, in this paper I 
shall not consider the theoretical implications of this potential of the syntactic theory presented here. 
equum omne videns" from "quemdam equum videns" obtained by clause (2). So it is 
the second half of clause (2) that takes care of this possibility, stating that the 
participle itself may also be determined by a signum even when occurring after its 
adjunct(s), in which case, however, the resulting term will be determinate (DTRM) 
to which clause (7) is not applicable. 
The subsequent clauses provide for the construction of complex terms with a 
noun as their core along with several types of possible adjuncts. 
In virtue of clause (3) "homo albus", "equus non caecus", and the like 
constructions are indefinite terms, obtained by the concatenation of a noun and an 
adjective (NA) with the optional interposition of a negation. 
Note that in clause (4) the term that, concatenated with the genitive of another 
term yields a new indefinite term can also be obtained by clause (3). So "equus non 
caecus cuiusdam hominis" is also a possible result of the application of clause (4). 
Again, the clause takes care of semantically relevant variations of word order. As 
we shall see, "equus omnis hominis" and "omnis hominis equus" may have different 
semantic values. (The former can refer to a horse only if it is possessed by all men, 
while in the latter, on one of its possible readings, for every given person some or 
other of his horses is being referred to, without implying that any horse would 
belong to all persons.) 
Note also that the second part of the clause makes it possible that the core of such 
a complex term be determinate (DTRM), which is especially relevant when the geni- 
tive precedes it, as in: "cuiusdam hominis omnis equus", which is again semantically 
different from "om& equus cuiusdam hominis". (The former concerns all of some 
man's horses, while in the latter reference is made to all horses possessed by 
someone or other.) 
By clause (5) we can build further the term obtained above to get, e.g., "equus 
non caecus cuiusdam hominis videns omnem hominem". In view of the possibility 
changing word order, by this clause also "omnem horninem cuiusdam hominis equus 
non caecus videns" is a term. 
In virtue of clause (6) any of the above-mentioned indefinite terms prefured with a 
negation are also indefinite terms, while a defrnite term prefixed with a negation is a 
definite term. 
By clause (7) any indefinite term prefixed with a signum (which itself may also be 
prefured with a negation) is a definite term? 
Clauses (8) and (9) take care of complex terms formed with relative clauses. 
Clause (8) treats relative clauses as adjuncts to other terms, as in "omnis equus 
Socratis qui est album", while clause (9) treats them as independent terms in their 
own right, as in "quod est equus Socratis". Of course, these clauses are also 
applicable recursively, as in the case of "quod est quod est equus Socratis", which 
may be redundant, but is otherwise acceptable. 
l1 Note here that proper nouns are also included here as possible core-terms, and so the rule allows 
them to be determined not only by adjuncts, but also by sip, that is, determiners. This would probably 
not be endorsed by Buridan. Nevertheless, from a semantic point of view their inclusion here is rather 
harmless (they just provide cases of "vacuous quantification"), and in any case simplifies the formulation 
of these clauses. 
I 
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Note here that these clauses do not provide for constructions like "homo qUi est 
albus", but do allow constructions like "homo qui est album". This apparent oddity is 
introduced only to simplify these clauses, and is after all in good accord with 
Buridan's theory of predication, in which a predicate term is supposed to be a 
referring expression in the same way as a subject term in order to be convertible 
with it.12 
As can be seen, these clauses do not generate relative clauses in oblique cases, 
like the one in: "homo quem equus est videns". But since the incorporation of such 
clauses would be just further complication without much theoretical import, we can 
disregard them in this fragment. (On the basis of the existing clauses, I think it is 
quite easy to imagine how they could be handled anyway.) 
Clause (10) generates disjunctive terms in all cases and genders, the only 
restriction in this respect being that the disjuncts be of the same case and gender. Its 
recursive applicability also allows these terms to contain an unlimited number of 
disjuncts. 
Clause (11) takes care of both affiimative and negative propositions including 
constructions like "homo est album", or "homo est omne album", where concerning 
gender agreement the same considerations apply as in the case of relative clauses 
above. 
Finally clause (12) allows negation to appear also as a prefur to a proposition as a 
whole, as in "Non non omnis homo est albus". 
A notable general feature of these clauses is that they allow the construction of 
syntactically ambiguous complex expressions, i.e., expressions that can be obtained 
from the vocabulary by applying different sets of these rules in different order. Of 
course, in the semantic theory we shall have to be able to distinguish between these 
different possible constructions, which shall correspond to different "readings" or 
senses of these expressions. To distinguish these different constructions, we can 
assign the syntactic clauses given above characteristic functions, ie., functions that 
correspond to the applications of these clauses, taking the input expressions of the 
clauses as their arguments, and yielding the output expressions as their values: 
l2 Cf.: "Et tunc distinguitur triplex passio, una substantiva, alia adjectiva adjective sumpta e t  tertia 
adjectiva in neutro genere substantivata. De primo modo dicimus 'tempus' csse passionem 'motus' et 
'simitatem' 'cavitatis': nam ultra significationem 'cavitatis' 'simitas' appellat nasum; est ergo praedicatio 
passionis de  subjecto 'motus est tempus' vel 'cavitas est simitas'. De secundo autem modo, 'simum' est 
passio 'nasi' e t  'album' 'hominis', vel 'lapidis', vel 'entis'; e t  est praedicatio passionis d e  subjecto dicere 
'nasus est simus', 'homo est albus', vel 'res est alba', e t  cetera. De tertio modo, est praedicatio passionis 
de subjecto dicere 'nasus est simum', 'homo est album'. In primo autem modo et  in tertio convertitur 
praedicatio passionis de  subjecto in praedicationem subjecti de  passione, ut 'cavitas est simitas; ergo 
simitas est cavitas', similiter 'homo est album; ergo album est homo'. Sed in secundo modo non sic fit 
conversio; dicimus enim 'nasus est simus', sed non dicimus 'simus est nasus', quia oratio csset incongrua, 
vel imperfecta, sicut dictum est prius, sed convertendo oportet adjectivum substantivare ut 'homo est 
albus; ergo album est homo'. Et  ex his statim manifestum est quod passiones de  secundo dictorum 
modorum non sunt per se acceptae diffinibiles diffinitione praedicabili de  diffinito significative sumpto, 
quia non possunt per se subjici in p r o p i t i o n e  categorica, ut dictum est." SL, Tractatus Octavus: D e  
Divisionibus, c. 2, 4. In view of this it is probable that Buridan would also have accepted the 
construction: 'homo qui est album', that is, 'homo qui est quoddam album'. 
Where the metavariables in (Fl)-(F2), (F3), (F4)-(F5), (F6)-(F7), (F8)-(F14) are 
the same as in (2), (3), (4), (9, (6)-(12), respectively. 
With the help of these characteristic functions we can supply disambiguated 
analyses of ambiguous complex expressions of our fragment, in such a manner that 
these analyses can serve in the semantic theory to distinguish between the different 
senses of these expressions. Just by way of illustration consider the following two 
simple examples: "omnis hominis equus", "non homo vel equus est albus". 
The first of these can be analysed in two different ways: it may be regarded either 
as a complex term which is formed from a noun and a genitive, determined by a 
signum, or as a complex term formed from a noun as its core, and a genitive 
determined by a signum in the genitive case. 
/A/ F9(omnis)(hominis equus) 
/B/ Fs(omnis hominis)(equus) 
/A'/ F9(omnk)(F5(hominis)(equus))) 
/B'/ F5(F9(omnis)(hominis))(equus)) 




Of course both of these can be analysed further as follows: 
For the second example I give here only the fully expanded analyses, showing how 
Fl,(non)(F13(est)(F12(vel)(homo)(equus))(dbus)) =%on homo vel equus est 
albus" 
F13(est)(F12(vel)(F8(non)(homo))(equus)))(dbus) = "non homo vel equus est 
albus" 






A Buridanian semantics cannot be one that construes meaning as a relation 
between words and extramental things alone. To be sure, for Buridan many words of 
our languages are imposed to signify extramental things. However, several 
expressions of our languages, namely some syncategorematic expressions, sigmfy 
nothing at all in external reality, but only concepts of the mind (which, though, are 
real entities, ontologically on a par with other qualities); and even those that signify 
extramental things do so only by sirmifving concepts of the mind immediately, and 
signify extramental things only by the mediation of these, namely signifying the 
things that are conceived by the concepts signified by them immediately. This 
mediation also means that an expression signifying something ad extra owes its 
external signification exclusively to the concept that it signifies apud mentem, i.e. to 
which it is subordinated should the same expression be subordinated to another 
concept, it would thereby signifj those things which are conceived by this other 
concept, that is, it would have a different meaning. 
This two-tier structure of meaning, which, to be sure, was not a peculiarity of 
Buridan's semantics in the Middle Ages, was developed to its utmost consequences 
by Buridan. Most importantly, he went as far as supposing the existence of a fully 
articulated mental language immediately signified by, and thereby conferring 
meaning on (vocal and written forms of) any kind of human idioms (including even 
sign-languages) . 
This "mentalese", however, is by no means an in principle inaccessible "private 
language" of individual language users. It is precisely its systematic bit-by-bit 
relationship with spoken and written languages that makes it accessible in ordinary 
communication, whereby individual language users are able to think the same 
thoughts, despite the fact that this is realized through their having numerically dis- 
tinct, individual mental acts. For example, even if the concept immediately sigdied 
by the term 'homo' in my mind is a numerically distinct entity from the concept sig- 
nified immediately by the same term in your mind, provided we conceive the same 
things by these concepts, namely human beings, we assign the same meaning to the 
same term and we are able to form the same thoughts with these concepts. Indeed, 
the same concept in my mind (as well as in yours) can be immediately signified also 
by the English word 'man', which explains why we are able to think of the same 
things by using either of these words, i.e., why we understand both the Latin and the 
English word as meaning the same. 
To be sure, since subordinating words to concepts by imposing them to mean 
something is conventional and is entirely in our power, it may happen that the same 
word is assigned different meanings by different persons on different occasions. So 
the immediate signification of a term is always dependent on its actual imposition. 
But given this imposition the term is subordinated to some particular concept of a 
human mind, and provided users of the same term agree on imposing the same word 
to slgnrfy one of their concepts by which they conceive the same things in the same 
way, they mean the same by the same term. 
The restriction: "conceive the same things in the same way" is significant here. For 
our concepts representing extramental things may relate to the things they represent 
in different ways according to Buridan. Our absolute concepts sigmfy directly and in 
the same way all the things they represent. Our connotative concepts, however, sig- 
d y  some of the things they represent directly, but some of them obliquely, as 
adjacent or non-adjacent to what they sigmfy directly, which means that whatever 
they signify directly they signify only in relation to what they connote either positively 
or negatively. 
For example, the English terms 'sighted' and 'blind' and, correspondingly (and 
indeed primarily), the concepts associated to them, according to this analysis both 
signify directly animals. Indeed, both of these terms signify animals connoting their 
sight. But while 'sighted' connotes the sight of a particular 6 a l  positively, as 
adjacent to that animal, 'blind', on the contrary, connotes its sight negatively, as non- 
adjacent to it. Consequently, the term 'sighted' will refer to this animal in a present 
tense affirmative proposition only if it actually does have sight, while 'blind' would 
do the same only if the animal does not have sight. In fact, both of these terms have 
reference not only to what they stand for in a proposition but also an oblique 
reference to what they connote even outside a proposition. Buridan calls this oblique 
reference appeZlQtion. As can be seen, positive or negative appeZZation of their 
connotata is of primary importance in determining the reference of connotative or, 
as Buridan more frequently calls them, appeZZative terms. 
Since according to Buridan the import of the affirmative copula is the identity of 
the supposita of the terms flanking it, reference, or using the mediaeval technical 
term, supposition of a categorematic term in a proposition is crucial in determining 
the truth conditions of categorical propositions. But supposition (and appellation) of 
terms in the context of a proposition is dependent on their si&ication (and 
connotation in the case of connotative terms) even outside a proposition, which in 
turn is dependent on the sigaJfication of the concepts to which they are subor- 
dinated. 
Accordingly, in constructing the semantics for the fragment defined above, first 
we have to establish the relation of subordination, or immediate signification 
between items of our fragment and concepts of human minds. As a second step, we 
have to define their ultimate signification in terms of their immediate signification. 
Finally we have to define the supposition of terms in several propositional contexts, 
by which we shall be able to provide a definition of truth and consequence for this 
fragment. 
The definition of these semantic relations in a model theoretical framework can 
be given in basically the standard way, namely defining them as mappings from 
syntactic items to a domain containing their possible semantic values, a so-called 
universe of discourse, usually an arbitrary set. However, to provide a construction 
true to the spirit of Buridan's ideas several further qualifications are in order. 
First of all, as the above-sketched analysis of the semantics of the term 'blind' 
f 
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should already suggest, we have to distinguish between actual and non-actual 
elements of our universe of discourse. But of course, since actuality is time-bound - 
what is actual now was not necessarily so in the past and need not be so in the future 
-, we have to think of actual entities as forming some subset of the universe of 
discourse relative to some given time t. So if the universe of discourse is some set W, 
then the set of actual things at time t, A(t), is to be a subset of W. (A(t) CW) 
In this way we can easily account for the fact that in some contexts we can 
successfully refer to something that actually does not exist. For example, if it i s  
winter and there are actualIy no roses in my garden, I can successfully refer to the 
roses we saw last summer in my garden with the true sentence “I had beautiful roses 
here last summer”. On the other hand, the sentence “I have beautiful roses in my 
garden”, uttered at the same time is false, precisely because there are actually no 
roses in my garden at the time of its utterance.13 
The difference, as Buridan explains, is that in the fwst sentence the past tense of 
the verb makes the range of reference of the term ‘rose’ extend beyond the domain 
of actual entities, permitting it to refer to what was a rose, even if now it is perished, 
and so does not exist. But in the present-tense sentence the same term cannot refer 
to anything, there being nothing to which it would actually apply. In the model 
theory we can represent this situation by assigning a zero-entity, say 0, which falls 
outside the universe of discourse (0 fZ W), as its value to the function assigning terms 
their suppositu at some given present time t. (Say, SUP(‘rose’)(t)=O) On the other 
hand, in the past tense context, in which its range is extended, or ampliated, to use 
Buridan’s term, to past roses, a suppositurn of this term is an element of a domain of 
entities which were actual at some earlier time: SUPp(‘rose’)(t) EA(t’) UA(t), where 
t’<t. 
l3 ”... hoc significatur per nomen quod per ipsum positum in oratione intelligitur, cum significare est 
intellectum rei constituere. Sed per hoc nomen ‘rosa’ intelligitur rosa, et per hoc nomen ‘rose’ 
intelliguntur rose. Verbi gratia tu et ego simul anno preterito vidimus multas rosas rubras. Si ergo ego 
pet0 a te: “nonne rose quas vidirnus erant rubre?”, tu dicis quod “ymmo”. Quod scis esse verum. Quod 
tamen tu non scinx si non intelligercs istas rosas. Tu ergo per illud nomen ‘rosas’ cum dico ”vidimus 
rosas” intelligis ea que vidimus. Sed vidimus rosas rubras. Igitur intelligis mas. Quarta conclusio est 
quod hoc nomen ‘rosa’ supponit pro tosas et hoc nomen ‘rose’ supponit pro rosis, licet nulla sit rosa, 
quia secundum casu predictum, scilicet quod anno preterito vidimus rnultas rosas rubras, tu concedis 
illam ‘multe rose rubre fuerunt anno preterito’; et eam scis esse veram. Et cum sit affirmativa, non essct 
vera nisi subiectum, quod est hoc nomen ‘rose!’, pro aliquo supponeret, vel pm aliquibus. Sed tamen non 
supponit pro alio vel pro aliis quam pro rosis. ... notandum est quod possumus intelligere res sine 
differentia temporis et intelligere preteritas vel futuras sicud presentes. Propter hoc etiam possumus 
inponere w e m  ad significandum sine differentia temporis. Sic enim nomina significant. Unde specific0 
conceptu ‘hominis’ ego indifferenter omnes homines concipio presentes pretentos et futuros. Et per hoc 
nomen ‘homo’ omnes indifferenter significantur presentes, preteriti et futuri. Ideo vere dicimus quod 
omnis homo qui fuit, fuit animal, et omnis homo qui erit, erit animal. Et propter hoc consequitur quod 
ista ‘intelligerd, ‘&ire’, ‘significarc’, et huiusmodi, et participia inde descendentia ampliant terminos cum 
quibus construuntur, ad supponendum indifferenter pro presentibus, preteritis et futuris et possibilibus 
que forte nec sunt nec erunt nec unquam fuerunt. Quamvis igitur nulla sit rosa, ego intelligo rosam non 
que a t  sed que fuit vel erit vel que potest esse. Et tunc quando dicitur: hoc nomen ‘ma’ significat 
aliquid, concedo. Et cum dicis: illud non est, concedo. Sed fuit. Si tunc concludis: igitur aliquid est nichil, 
nego consequentiam, quia in maiore iste terminus ‘aliquid’ crat ampliatus ad preterita et futura, et in 
conclusione est restrictus ad presentia. Et dictum fuit quod quod a termino amplion et  non distributo ad 
seipsum minus amplum non valet consequentia.” Johannes Buridanus: Questiones Longe super Librum 
Perihermeneias, ed. Ria van der Lecq, Utrecht, 1983, pp.12-14. 
The second point to be considered here is the representation of the signification 
of connotative, or appellative terms. As we have seen, such terms signify whatever 
they signify only in relation to other things, for example, the term ‘album’ s i i i e s  
white things (including past, future and possible ones, since ‘ s i w  ampliates also to 
these domains) only by connoting their whitenesses, whether these whitenesses are 
actual or not. Of course, it will, nevertheless, supposit only for things which are 
acrud2y white in a sentence like ‘Animal est album’. But to supposit for them this 
term first has to signrfy them, and it signifies them only in relation to their 
whitenesses. Similarly, it will supposit for p u t  white things in a sentence like 
”Animal f i t  album”, but it can supposit for them also in this sentence only because it 
signdies them connoting their past whitenesses, which need not be actual at the time 
of the utterance of this sentence. 
On the other hand, the term ‘albedo’ s iw ies  individual whitenesses of individual 
substances absolutely, without connoting anything, in the same way as the term 
‘homo’ signifies individual men, or the term ‘rosa’ signifies individual roses. So if we 
denote a significate of the term ‘albedo’ like this: SGT(‘albedo’), we can say that it is 
just an element of a subset of the universe of discourse, namely an element of the 
signification of ‘albedo’, the set of things naturally and directly represented by the 
concept to which the term ‘albedo’ is subordinated. (SGTfalbedo’) E SGfalbedo’), 
where SG(‘albedo’)CW.) A suppositurn of the same term in a present tense 
proposition uttered at some time t is identical with one of its significata that are 
actual at that time, provided there are any, otherwise it supposits for nothing, that is 
to say, it takes 0 as its value: 
SUP(‘albedo’)(t) =SGT(‘albedo’), if SGT(‘albed0’) E A(t), otherwise 
SUP(‘albedo’)(t) =O. 
In a very interesting passage Buridan analyses the semantics of adjectives in 
comparison with the way possessives determine the supposition of their head- 
According to this analysis ‘album’ in “animal album” bears a similar 
relationship to ‘albedo’ as ‘hominis’ in “animal hominis” to ‘homo’. 
Now ‘hominis’ is certainly a phrase that does not signify ad extra anything 
different from what the term ‘homo’ signifies, namely individual men. However, it 
signifies them differently, namely as adjacent to what the term with which ‘horninis’ 
is constructed signifies. But in view of the above considerations this should mean 
l4 Sed cum dico ‘homo albus cumt’, ego credo quod ‘albus’ nullam substantiam significat, sed 
albedinem tantum. Et ita nihil plus vel aliud, nisi quantum ad mod- significandi grammaticales, 
significat iste terminus ‘albus’ quam iste terminus ‘albedo’, sed idem diversirnode significant, scilicet 
albedinem; nam ‘albedo’ significat ipsam per modum subsistentis et ‘albus’ per modum alteri adjacentis. 
Et sic put0 debere intelligi quod bene dicit Aristotiles in Praedicamentis, scilicet quod ‘album’ nihil aliud 
significat quam qualitatem, quod credo esse verum accipiendo ‘album’ adjective, ut dicendo ‘lignum 
album’. Put0 ergo quod ‘album’ in neutro genere substantivatum et supponit et appellat; ‘albus’ autem 
non supponit, sed solum appellat, et illud appellat quod significat. Ita etiam ego credo quod nomen 
substantivum obliquum non supponit, sed solum, et appellat illud quod significat, et appellando bene 
determinat suppositionem substantivi cui adjungitur. Et idem, et non aliud, signifiat rectus et ejus 
obliquus, sed diversis modis quantum ad diversos mod- significandi grammaticales; quia rectus 
significat secundum modum subsistentis et obliquus per modum adjacentis, seu habentis se aliquo mod0 
ad rem quem rectus cum quo construitur significat vel pro qua supponit. SL, Tractatus Octaw:  De 
Divisionibus, c. 2,4. 
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that the complex term "animal hominis" is a connotative term, signifying animals in 
relation to men. So 'hominis' in itself is a connotative term as well, connoting men, 
and the things to which these men are signified as adjacent. 
Consequently, we should treat the genitive case as an "unsaturator", indicating 
that the genitive form of a noun signifies apud mentem a connotative concept 
connoting what is signified directly by the absolute concept to which the nominative 
form is subordinated and what is signified by the head-noun with which the genitive 
form is constructed. And this, by the way, explains why such a genitive cannot be a 
subject or a predicate of a proposition in itself. For in itself it is incomplete, to be 
completed by a nominative supplying one of its connotata. So along these lines we 
can construct a sigaificate of "animal hominis" as follows: 
SGT("animal hominis") = SGT('hominis')(SGT('animal'))(SGT('homo')), where 
SGT('hominis')(u)(SGT('homo')) = u E W. 
constructed as follows: 
SGT("&al album") = SGT( 'album') (SGT( 'animal')) (SGT( 'albedo')), where 
SGT('a!bum')(u)(SGT('albedo')) = uE W. 
Technically, SGT here is a function which for the term 'album' as its argument 
yields another function as its value, which can take another thing as its argument, 
namely the thing having whiteness (whether actually or not), yielding another 
function as its value that can take a further thing as its argument, a significate of the 
term 'albedo', that is, an individual whiteness connoted by 'album' as adjacent to this 
thing, yielding this thing as its value. Of course, a suppositurn of this term in the 
context of a present tense proposition uttered at some time t can be only a thing that 
actually has whiteness at t, that is to say, if the term 'albedo' can successfully refer to 
(supposit for) this whiteness at that time as an appellaturn of the term 'album':15 
SUP("animaI album")( t) = SGT('album')(SUP( 'anim&)(t)) (SUP('albedo') (t)) if 
SUP('&al')(t) EA(t) and SUP('albedo')(t) EA(t), otherwise 
SUP("animal album")(t) =O. 
The main advantage of this treatment of connotative terms is that the arity of the 
term which it interprets does not determine the arity of SGT, still we do not have to 
take, e.g., ordered n-tuples as its arguments. For otherwise we could take SGT to be, 
e.g., a two-place function having a term in its first, and the term's connotatum in its 
second argument place, but then the same function could not interpret terms of 
different arities. Alternatively, we could define it as a two-place function taking a 
term in its first, and ordered n-tuples in its second argument place. But in this case, 
st;U, the same function could not interpret absolute terms (unless we would 
introduce some artificial null-tuple) and we would have to regard a connotative 
term's connotata to be entities which do not occur in Buridan's nominalist ontology. 
Furthermore, the treatment proposed above renders technically easy and quite 
natural the representation of a peculiar feature of the Buridanian semantics of 
But then, in a similar manner, a signifcate of 'animal album' should be 
l5 Cf.: "Et primo dim quod terminus substantivus obliquus appellat illud pro quo rectus suus 
supponeret per modum adjacentis ei pro quo rectus regens @urn supponit." SL, Tractatus Quartus: De 
Suppositionibus, c5,4.  
connotative terms, namely that their semantic arity is not determined by the number 
of their syntactic complements. What matters in this regard is only that at the end of 
the iterated application of functional composition we get a saturated entity, an 
element of the universe of discourse, but the number of intermediary functions is 
dependent solely on whether at any given step a given function for a given argument 
will yield a further function again or a saturated entity, thereby ending the process. 
Indeed., this kind of construction makes it possible that the same expression has 
different arities, as it should be the case e.g. with adjectives or participles occurring 
either as standalone terms substantivated in the neutral gender, or as adjuncts to 
nouns. 
A further point worth preliminary consideration is Buridan's theory of appellatio 
rationis used by him to explain the peculiarities of reference in intentional contexts. 
Although several recent commentators think differently, I think we can treat this 
theory as a consistent part of Buridan's general theory of appellation.I6 The only 
difference between appellation of an appellative term in general and a case of 
appellatio rationis is that in the latter case oblique reference is made not to the 
connotafu of an appellative term, but to the ratio si&ied by any term, whether 
appellative or not, in the context of an intentional verb or, rather, the participle 
derived from it. 
For example, according to Buridan, the participle 'debens' makes the accusative 
constructed with it appellate its own ratio, which explains why it cannot be replaced 
by a term in a proposition like "Plato est debens Socrati equum", unless this term is 
strictly synonymous with it. For in this sentence a significate of the term "debens 
Socrati equum", in accordance with our previous considerations, is to be constructed 
as follows: 
SGTCdebens') (SGT( 'Socrates')) (RAT( 'equus')) (SGTCequus')) (t), where 
RATCequus') is the ratio of the term 'equus'. 
SUPCdebens tibi equum')(t) = 
= SGTcdebens') (SUP('Socr at es')( t)) (RAT('equus')) (SUP( 'equus') (t')) (t), if this is 
an element of A(t), otherwise SUP("debens tibi equum")(t) = 0. (Where t' is equal to 
or greater than t, because of the ampliative force of 'debens'.) 
But so, since the sentence is true iff the supposita of its terms are the same, and 
whether this or that individual is supposited for by its predicate term depends on the 
ratio of its accusative, clearly, replacing the accusative may change the truth value of 
this sentence, even if the replacing term would refer to the same thing(~).'~ 
For this idea to work in general, however, we clearly should be able to identify 
rationes of terms. But to this end first we have to be clear about what rationes are. 
In many places, Buridan uses the term 'ratio' interchangeably with the term 
'conceptus', or 'intentio'. But, as we have seen, concepts are individual mental acts of 
Accordingly, a suppositurn of the same term in the above proposition is: 
l6 For references see my "'Debeo tibi equum': A Reconstruction of the Theoretical Framework of 
Buridan's Treatment of the Sophisma", in: S.L. Read (ed.): Sophism in Mediuevd Logic and Grammar: 
A ts of the Ninth European Symposium of Mediaeval b g i c  and Semantics, to appear. 
IfFor more detailed discussion see again my paper referred to in the previous note. 
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individual human minds, which, when by an act of imposition get associated with 
vocal or written expressions, are responsible for the meaning of these expressions. 
This understanding of concepts (as individual mental acts) and their relation to 
the meaning of linguistic items, renders meaning doubly relative. On the one hand, 
you and I may associate different concepts with the same expression, and hence 
attribute to it different meanings, while on different occasions even I may use the 
Same expression in a different sense, associating it with some different concept, and 
thereby imposing it to mean something different, on the other. Whether on these 
different occasions you will be able to understand what Imean depends on whether 
you will be able to associate with the expression in question the same (type of) 
concept, i.e. a mental act by which you conceive the same things and in the same way 
as I do. If so, and this usage catches on, i.e., also other users of our language are able 
and willing to use this expression in the same way in the future (at least, perhaps, in 
virtue of some temporary agreement, for a limited period of time, as in obligational 
disputes frequently referred to by Buridan in this context), then my act of imposition 
will constitute a new meaning for the expression, observed by everybody who 
understands this expression in this sense. Otherwise my usage of the expression is an 
idiosyncrasy, having to do perhaps with my linguistic incompetence, my joking mood, 
momentary insanity, or grave conceptual differences (which may be but a 
euphemism for permanent insanity), etc. We can say, however, that if there is a valid 
convention of its usage, the ratio of an expression is but a concept associated with 
this expression by an act of imposition, no matter whose concept, mine or yours, 
insofar as we use this expression subordinated to the same type of concept. But, as I 
have said above, our individual concepts can be said to be of the same type, if we 
conceive by them the same things in the same way, i.e., if they have the same 
meaning. 
With this, however, we seem to have entered a vicious circle: our expressions 
mean the same, if they are subordinated to the same concepts, while these concepts 
are said to be the same, if they signify the same; that is to say, concept identity is just 
synonymy and vice versa, but neither of these is clearer than the other, and Quineans 
may rejoice. 
Despite appearances, however, this is no more vicious than it is a circle. For the 
signification of a concept is a natural relation, determined by the nature of the 
concept alone, not dependent on any further semantic medium. So we can say that 
simple absolute concepts are identical if and only if they signify the same, i.e., the set 
of their significata is the same, and simpIe connotative concepts are the same if and 
ody if they signify the same, i.e., the sets of their signifmta and connotata are the 
same. But in a model theory sets are well-behaved entities with respect to identity. 
So in such a theory the identification of simple concepts should present no extra 
difficulty, provided we assign them in a model their si’i@ata (and connotata) in a 
systematic manner, which renders the identification of these sets possible. 
Now in view of these considerations we can say that our model theory will have to 
contain a function assigning concepts of individual minds (m) to linguistic 
expressions (X) relative to individual acts of imposition (i), like this: 
CON(m>(i)(X) EW. 
These individual concepts, provided they are simple, will be identified on the basis 
of their significations: 
cON(m)(i)(X) = CON(m)(i)(X) iff SG(CON(m)(i)(X)) = SG(CON(m)(i)(X’)) 
concepts, provided these concepts are of the same type, i.e., if they signify the same: 
RAT(i)(X) = CON(m)(i)(X) /that is to say, RAT= CON(m)/ if 
SG(CON(m)(i)(X)) = SG(CON(m’)(i)(X)), for any m’, otherwise RAT(i)(X) =O. 
To be sure, rationes in this way will be just the same individual mental acts as 
concepts, nevertheless, these concepts will be identified as rationes only if their 
individual differences, depending on to which individual mind they belong, are 
irrelevant from the point of view of their significative function. (Otherwise, as the 
second half of the clause above states, we cannot assign a definite ratio to a given 
expression, but we can, of course, assign it several idiosynaatic concepts of 
individual users of it, which, however, may be interesting more from a pragmatic, 
than from a semantic point of view.’8) This significative function, however, is 
affected by different impositions: if a term, like e.g. ‘seal’ in English, is correlated 
with two different types of concepts by different acts of imposition, then also the 
rationes corresponding to this term are different depending on according to which 
imposition we interpret it. On the other hand, if the expression in question is 
unequivocal, this means that the meaning of this expression is not a function of 
different impositions. @ch is equivalent to saying that it is never imposed to mean 
something different: it si@ies the same for any imposition i, that is, it is a constant 
function of these different impositions.) So to simphfy matters, in the case of such an 
expression we can omit reference to different impositions and give its ratio directly, 
like this: 
RAT(X) = CON(m)(i)(X) if SG(CON(m)(i)(X)) = SG(CON(m’)(?)(X)) for any m’ 
and any 2, otherwise RAT(X) =O. 
In the case of complex concepts, on the other hand, the guide for their 
identification should be their structure, i.e., the way they are built up from their 
already well-identifiable components. The reason for this is that complex concepts 
may sirmtfv exactly the same thing or things, but be distinct from one another due to 
their different structure, Buridan’s most frequently used example is the pair of 
mental propositions expressed by the sentences ‘Deus est Deus’ and ‘Deus non est 
Deus’.lg The vocal or written sentences both sign@ one and the same thing ad extra, 
The rationes of these expressions, on the other hand, will be identified with these 
t 
I 
For a discussion of these topics, though in a different formal framework, see my “Understanding 
Matters from a Logical Angle: Logical Aspects of Understanding” in: G. Klima: Ars Artium: A n  Artium: 
f$says in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modem, Budapest, 1988. 
Cf.: “Sed statim tu quaercs “si in re significata vel in rebus significatis non sit aliqua complexio, quid 
ergo significat oratio mentalis qua intellectus dicit deum esse deum vel deum non essc deum?“. 
Respondeo quod nihil plus vel aliud significat ad extra una dictarum orationum quam alia. Neutra enim 
significat ad extra nisi deum; sed alio modo significat affirmativa et alio modo negativa, et illi modi sunt 
in anima illi conceptus complexki q u a  secunda operatio intellectus addit supra simplices conceptus, qui 
designantur per istas copulas vocales ‘a t ’  et ‘non at’.” SL, Tractatus Primus: De Propitione, c.3,l. 
”... istae pmpitiones ‘deus est deus’ ct ‘dew non a t  dew’ nihil omnino aliud, plus aut minus 
significant ad extra quam iste terminus ‘deus’, dum tamen haec dictio ‘at’ sumatur praeciSe ut copula, 
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namely God. The two sentences, nevertheless, are not synonymous, because they 
signify different mental propositions apud mentem. For the negative sentence 
beyond the concepts signified by the affirmative one also signifies the concept of 
negation, which makes it si@ the same thing in a different manner, namely neg- 
atively, which renders these two sentences contradictory, i.e., the one true if and only 
if the other is false. But sentences are true or false only in virtue of the truth or 
falsity of the mental propositions they express; but no mental proposition can be true 
and false at the same time. Therefore, the mental propositions corresponding to 
these sentences are different, having different internal structures. 
But what is it that accounts for these different structures? For it is certainly not 
the temporal or spatial order of their parts as is the case with the spoken or written 
counterparts of these mental sentences. The answer lies in the operation of the 
"glue" of these mental propositions, the syncategorematic, or as Buridan also most 
aptly calls them, completive concepts. The role of these concepts is to form complex 
concepts out of other concepts, thereby moddjmg the ways these other concepts 
relate to the things conceived by them. So these complexive concepts can be 
represented by functions taking concepts into complex concepts, the semantic 
relations of which will be determined how they are constructed by way of these com- 
plexive concepts. 
For example, the copula, 'est', is a complexive concept, taking other, simple or 
already complex, categorematic concepts as its arguments (and connoting some time 
t), yielding a mental proposition, like this? 
RAT('est')(cl)(c2)(RAT(t)) E W. (Where RAT(t) is the concept of the present time 
connoted by the copula of the proposition. So RAT is defined not only for linguistic 
expressions, but also for time-points, or intervals.) 
Accordingly, the mental proposition corresponding to 'Deus est Deus' may be 
constructed as follows: 
RAT("Deus est Deus")(RAT(t)) = RAT('est')(RAT('Deus'))(RAT('Deus'))(RAT(t)) 
On the other hand, the concept of propositional negation, RAT('non'), is a one- 
place functor taking a mental proposition as its argument, yielding a complex 
concept, another mental proposition, the truth value of which is the opposite of that 
sicut post dicetur. Nec ista oratio 'omnis homo est animal' plus vel minus vel aliud significat praeter 
conceptus animae quam ista 'nullus homo est animal'. Unde signa solum significant quo  modo termini 
m a l e s  e t  mentales eis correspondentes supponunt, nihil ultra significando. Et istae copulae 'est' e t  'non 
a t '  significant diversos modos complectendi tenninos mentales in formando p r o p i t i o n e s  mentales, e t  
illi modi complectendi sunt conceptus complexivi pertinentes ad secundam operationem intellectus, 
prout ipsa addit super primam operationem. Et ita etiam istae dictiones 'et', Gel', 'si', 'ergo' et hujus 
modi designant conceptus complexim plurium p r o p i t i o n u m  simul, vel tenninorum, in mente, e t  nihil 
ulterius ad extra. Et  tales voces vocantur 'pure syncategorematicae' quia non sunt significativae ad extra 
nisi cum aliis, ad istum Sensum quod totum aggregatum ex dictionibus categorematicis e t  
syncategorematicis significat bene res extra conceptas, sed hoc est ratione dictionum categorematicarum. 
"kf.: "Credo enim quod illi concept us a quibus sumuntur istae dictiones syncategorematicae 'et', 'vel', 
'si', quamvis sint conceptus complexivi plurium propi t ionurn  vel terminorurn, tamen non sunt 
complexi ex pluribus, sed simplices. Et  ita etiam est de conceptu hujus verbi 'est' prout praecise sumitur 
tamquam copula. Unde sic est dictio pure syncategorematica; tamen forte prout connotaret certum 
tempus, jam exiret a simplicitate, nec esset purum syncategorema, prout alias dicetur." SL, Tractatus 
Quartus: De Suppositionibus, c.2'4. 
Tractatus Quartus: De Suppositionibus, c.2,3. 
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of its argument. So the mental proposition signifred apud mentem by 'Deus non est 
Dew' is to be constructed as follows: 
mT("Deus non est Deus")(RAT(t)) = 
mT('non')(RAT('est')) (RAT('Deus'))(RAT('Deus'))(RAT(t)) 
since according to Buridan spoken or written sentences are true only in virtue of 
being subordinated to true mental propositions,21 indeed, truths and falsities are 
nothing but true or false mental propositions, in our model theory we can define 
truth as the set of all true mental propositions, and the truth-conditions of these 
propositions as the conditions of membership in this set. 
For example, if V is the set of all truths: 
IPAT("Deus est Deus") (RAT( t)) E V iff 
SUP( RAT('Deus')) (t) = SUP(RAT('Deus')) (t) 
But of course, in the actual construction of the model theory we shall have to 
build such and similar particular conditions into general recursive rules defined for 
whole classes of expressions and concepts associated with them. However, as I 
indicated in the introduction, for want of space I cannot present here a complete 
model theory for the fragment of Latin constructed above. So I am going to provide 
only some of the most essential clauses along with some illustrations of how they are 









, SEMANTIC CATEGORIES 
I 
As from the foregoing it should be clear, for the formulation of the semantic 
definitions we shall have to introduce some further classifications of the expressions 
of our fragment beyond those provided by the syntactic construction. 
First of all, univocity or equivocity are semantic properties of terms that are not 
reflected by their syntactic categories. In our fragment the only equivocal term is 
'canis', which, in mediaeval examples, in one sense was taken to signify man's best 
friend, in another, the corresponding constellation. Accordingly, in the definitions 
above and hereafter all specifications concerning equivocity or univocity concern the 
term 'canis' on the one hand, and the rest of categorematic terms, on the other. So, 
if by EQU, we denote the set of equivocal terms, then this set in our fragment is 
defined simply as follows: 
EQU = { canis,}. 
manner: 
Correspondingly, the set of univocal terms (UNI) is defined in the following 
UNI:=TRMUVOC-EQU 
Secondly, for semantic purposes we have to distinguish between absolute (ABS) 
and appellative terms (APP): 
ABS:=PNpmUCNwmU RP,; APP=TRM-ABS. 
It will greatly simplifjl the formulation of semantic definitions if we distinguish 
21 "Et ideo non dicitur oratio vel p r o p i t i o  vocalis nisi quia designat orationem vel p r o p i t i o n e m  
mentalem, nec dicitur p m p i t i o  vocalis vera vel falsa nisi quia designat mentalem veram vel falsam, 
sicut nec urina dicitur Sana vel aegra nisi quia designat animal esse sanum vel aegrum." SL, Tractatus 
Primus: De P r o p i t i o n e ,  c.l,6. 
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between functorial and non-functorial expressions, and also between functorial 
expressions of different arities. Functorial expressions are appellative terms of our 
vocabulary subordinated to simple concepts, plus the syncategorematic terms: 
FUNC: = (voc nmp) u SYNC. 
Indeed, we may treat non-functorial expressions, i.e., absolute terms, as 0-ary 
functorial terms, which will also simplify later formulations. The sets of n-ary 
functorial terms, FUNC, are defined by the following clauses: 
FUNCa:=ABS 
FUNCI: = { non, quod,} U Sig U PN,, U CNsn 
FUNCZ: = { vel, album vide-,, habens,,, mortuh,,} 
FUNC3: = { est, videns, habens, mortuus,,} 
FUNC4: = { fuit, erit, deben&,,} 
FUNCS: = { debens,} 
Note here that adjectives, participles and relative pronouns in the neutral gender 
and nominative case, which can form standalone terms without a head-noun, appear 
also in a lesser functorial category. Let us denote the set of these functorial terms by 
F*.1 
As from the above definitions can be seen, all complex terms are appellative, but 
not all appellative terms are complex As Buridan insists, semantic simplicity or 
complexity is not determined by syntactic simplicity or complexity. This is 
determined on the level of concepts, to which the several, either simple or complex 
syntactic items are subordinated. Since, however, he admits the possibility of there 
being simple appellative concepts,” in this fragment I shall treat aIl syntactically 
simple appellative terms as being subordinated to some simple appellative concept, 
except for ‘caecum’, which, for illustrative purposes, I shall regard as synonymous 
with the phrase “animal non habens visum”. Accordingly, I will treat ‘caecum’ as 
semantically complex, being subordinated to the same complex ratio as its nominal 
definition: ‘animal non habens visum’. 
The sets of simple (SIM), and of complex (COMP) terms are, therefore, defmed 
as follows: 
SIM: =VOC-{ caecum,}; COMP = TRM-SIM. 
Furthermore, we need to distinguish between apmliative (AMPL) and non- 
ampliative terms. Also, among ampliative terms we have to distinguish those that 
ampliate to the past (AMPLp), from those that ampliate to the future (AMPb) and 
from those that ampliate to the possible (AMPL) and from the further possible 
combinations of these specifications, such as from those ampliating to the future and 
the possible ( A M P h ) ,  etc. In our fragment: 
AMPLp: = { mortuus,} 
A M P h :  = { debe-&j, where the asterisk indicates that it is the accusative 
complement that is ampliated to the future and possible. 
Again, we have to distinguish intentional participles (IN“), i.e., participles that 
s i m  mental acts, and which, therefore, make (some of) their complements appel- 
22 See especially in this connection A. Maierik ‘Significatio et Connotatio chez Buridan’, in: J. Pinborg 
(ed.): The bgic  of John Btcridan, Copenhagen, 1976. pp.110-111. 
late their rationes. In our fragment: 
INT: = { debenswM}, where the asterisk indicates that it is the accusative 
complement that is forced to appellate its own ratio. 
THE MODEL 
A model for the above-defined fragment is the following set-theoretical structure: 
M: = < W,T,I,C,S,A,P,CON,RAT,SG,O>, 
where W, T, I, C and S are nonempty sets, such that T,I,C,S C W, A(t) C P(t) C W, 
where tET; CON(m)(X)EC, provided X is some univocal expression of our 
fragment (X€UNI), otherwise CON(m)(i)(X)EC, where mES, i E I  and X is an 
equivocal expression of our fragment (XE EQU); 
MT(X) =CON(m)(X) if SG(CON(m)(X)) = SG(CON(m’)(X)), for any m’, 
otherwise RAT(X) = 0, where XE UNI, and 
RAT(i)(X) = CON(m)(i)(X) if SG(CON(m)(X)(i)) = SG(CON(m’)(X)(i)), for any 
m’, otherwise RAT(X)(i) = 0, where XE EQU; 
OB W, and SG is a function defined recursively below. 
Intuitively, W is the universe of discourse, the set of all items signifiable by 
expressions of our fragment, T is a set of time-points, or time-intervals, I is a set of 
acts of imposition, C is a set of concepts, S is a set of human souls or minds, A(t) 
and P(t) are the sets of signifiable things that are actual, and of those that are 
potential at time t, respectively; CON is a function assigning individual acts of 
individual human minds, m, with respect to some act of imposition, i, to expressions, 
X, of our fragment; RAT is a function assigning concepts to expressions in some 
mind m, provided that the concepts associated with the same expressions sigmfy the 
same in any other mind, either directly, if the expression in question is unequivocal, 
or depending on some act of imposition otherwise; SG is the function representing 
the relation of signification, defined both for concepts of human minds and for 
linguistic expressions subordinated to these. 
In the same model categorematic concepts and expressions will have further 
semantic values, namely signifcata and supposita (also connotata and appellata in the 
case of appellative terms) to be assigned to them by functions in a similar manner as 
in standard quantification theory value-assignments defined for variables assign 
several values to variables in the same model. 
“MENTALESE” AND SIGNIFICATION 
In the subsequent clauses RAT=CON(m), and the metavariables t, S, ti, ci and Ui 
The rutiones of (syntactically as well as semantically) simple terms are given by 
range over elements of T, Sig, TRM, C and of W, respectively. 




If X E UNI, then RAT(X) E C 
If XE EQU and i E I, then RAT(X)(i) E C 
If X€F”&,  then RAT(X)(cl) ...(c,,) EC (Of course, ifn=O, then 
RAT(X) E C.) 
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(RATfn-1) If XE FUNCn-1, and cl ...c, are as above, then RAT(X)(%) ...(%) E C. 
(This should be understood so that if X E FUNC1.l -, then 
RAT(X) E C.) 
(RATnon) If c=RAT(X), where XEFUNC, then RAT(non)(c)(cl) ...(%) E C 
(RATadj) If a,EAdj, then RAT("[non]agCn)= 
RAT("[non] a,') (RAT( %&)) = 
RAT(agc)(RAT([non] *)) E C, where 
adjective signifying quality (in our fragment: 'alb-',= 'albedo'). 
RAT(pnw)(RAT(t'))(RAT(t)) E C, where t' < t 
[RAT(non)l (RAT(agc)) (~T(agl3Jts)) = 
is the abstract form of an 
(RATmort) If bEPrtcUAMPLp) , then 
The rationes of semantically complex expressions are given as follows: 
(RATmb) If Fi(x1) (xz) ** - (~m) = X = Fj(y1) (yz) (yn) then 







Here should followfour cfauses running parallel with (RATla-d) above (indeed, 
we would need also a fifth one corresponding to (RATmort)), inserting the ratio of 
the head-noun with which a participle is construed, but for brevity, I omit them. 
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(RAT5) 
p T 6 )  
If X E TRM U PROP U Cop U Prtc U Aaj, then 
RAT("non X") = RAT(non)(RAT(X)) 
If b E  ITRM and +E SIG, then RAT("+ tF') = RAT(s,)(RAT(kc)) 
If t;)pomE TRM and qwmm E RP, then RAT( ' 'hm est Gm") = 
RAT(est) (RAT(q-m)) (RAT(tLm>)(RAT(t)) 
IftLmETRM, GmETRM and qgnomERP, then 
RAT("t1,m Qgnom est tLm") = 
RAT(est) (RAT(qpnom) (RAT(tlB,om)))(RAT(t28aom)) (RAT(t)) 
Here further clauses should follow taking care of relative clauses in different 
terns, but for the sake of brevity I omit them. See, however, the analoguous clauses 
for propositions below. 
(RATS) 
(RAT7) 
( U V a )  
If tl, t2,ETRM, then RAT("t1, vel t2,') = 
RAT(ve1) (RAT(t1,)) (RAT(t2gc)) 
(u rn)  If tlET-m and t&mETRMUAdjpmUPrtc,m then 
RAT("t1 [non] est Q)(RAT(t)) = 
RAT([non] est)(RAT(tl))(RAT(tZ))(RAT(t)) 
RAT("t1 [non] fuit t2")(RAT(t7))(RAT(t)) = 
RAT([non] fuit)(RAT(tl))(RAT(t2))(RAT(t7))(RAT(t)), where t' c t. 
RAT("t1 [non] erit tT)(RAT(t'))(RAT(t))= 
RAT([non] erit) (RAT(t 1))( RAT(t2)) (RAT(t')) (RAT(t)), where t' > t. 
RAT(caecumgc) = RAT("animal, non habens, Gum') = 
RAT("non habens,")(RAT(anim&c))(RAT(visus))(RAT(t)) = 
RAT(non) (RAT( habensgc)) RAT( ( animalgc))( RAT(Gus)) (RAT( t)) 
(FUT12b) RAT("n, [non] caecumgc) = RAT("+ [non] non habens, visum") = 
RAT("[ non] non habens,") ( ngc) (RAT(visus)) (RAT( t)) = 
RAT([non] non)(RAT(habens,,))(qJ(RAT(visus))(RAT(t)) = 
(RATlO) If t l  E T-, and &,€ TRM U Adj, U Prtcpm then 
(RAT11) If tlETRMpom and GmETRMUAdj,mUPrtcpm then 
(RAT12a) 
[ RWnon) 1 ( I w n o n )  (RAVabens,) 1) ( R w % ) )  
WT(visus)) (RAT(t)) 
The purpose of these clauses is to assign a ratio to all expressions of our 
fragment, i.e. a concept common to all those who understand these expressions in 
the Same way. Since understanding of the complex expressions should depend on the 
understanding of the simple ones that build them up, the rationes of complex 
expressions are to be determined in a compositional manner, on the basis of the 
W-ones of their simple constituents. 
Simple univocal terms are assigned a single ratio, by the first clause, while simple 
equivocal terms are assigned different rationes relative to different impositions. For 
example RAT(i)(caniS) is a concept representing man's best friend, while 
RGT(j)(canis) is another concept, representing the constellation. 
Simple functional n-ary terms are assigned concepts, which are themselves 
functions that take further concepts in their arguments, yielding further concepts, 
etc., n times. For example, RAT(videns) E C is a concept, which is such that it can be 
complemented with further concepts, to yield a further concept, like this: 
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RAT(videns)(cl)(cz) E C, where c1 is a concept signdied immediately by an accusative 
that can be constructed with the term %dens', while Q is a concept of a time-point 
(or interval) connoted by the present tense form of this participle, though not 
marked by a distinct part of speech. If the ratio of %dens' is complemented with 
both of these kinds of concepts, then it yields a concept that cannot be comple- 
mented any further, being in itself "saturated", making some perfect, determinate 
sense, like the concept corresponding to "videns hominem". Indeed, we get the 
concept corresponding to this complex phrase, if we complement the concept of 
tidens' first with the concept corresponding to 'hominem', and then with the 
concept of the time of the actual application of this phrase, just as it is prescribed by 
clause (RATla), like this: 
RAT("videns hominem") = RAT(videns) (RAT(hominem)) (RAT(t)). 
Simple functional n-ary terms may also appear in constructions in which they 
need less complements to make perfect sense. Indeed, in the above example, tidens' 
appeared like this, in its capacity to form a standalone term, without being an 
adjunct to a noun. However, when it is such an adjunct, as in "homo videns 
hominem", then its ratio is complemented first with the ratio of the noun which is in 
the same case as itself, and only afterwards with the other complements, like this: 
RAT("homo videns hominem") = 
RAT(videns)(RAT(homo))(RAT(hominem))(RAT(t)), as it would be prescribed by 
the rule corresponding to (RATla) omitted here for brevity. 
Notice that what makes the difference of this construction from that above is that 
the first complement concept here is a concept corresponding to the noun which is 
in the same case as the participle. If this head-noun is in the accusative itself, then so 
is the participle, yielding: 
RAT("hominem videntem hominem") = 
RAT(videntem)(RAT(hominem))(RAT(hominem))(RAT(t)). 
Clause (RATnon) stipulates that if the concept complementing the argument- 
place of the ratio of negation is an n-ary concept (i.e. a concept corresponding to an 
n-ary simple term), then the resulting concept is n-ary too, that is to say, it may, and 
indeed, should be complemented by n further concepts to yield a saturated concept. 
For example, if the concept to which the concept of negation is applied is the 
concept signified by the term 'videns', then the resulting concept is still to be 
complemented, as it is so complemented in the complex concept corresponding to 
the phrase "homo non videns hominem", like this: 
RAT("homo non videns hominem") = 
RAT(non)(RAT(videns))(RAT(homo))(RAT(hominem))(RAT(t)). 
Notice here that we are compelled to introduce this narrow-scope concept of 
negation, i.e., a negation that negates only a part of a term, as opposed to a negation 
negating a whole complex term yielding an infinite term, in order to distinguish the 
concept corresponding to "homo non videns hominem" from that corresponding to 
"non homo videns hominem". For the latter, at least on one of the possible readings 
of this phrase can be constructed as follows: 
RAT( 1) ("non homo videns hominem") = 
RAT(non) (RAT(videns) (RAT(homo)) (RAT(hominem)) (RAT( t))), 
where the concept of negation is applied to the whole concept corresponding to the 
complex term: "homo videns hominem". 
Evidently, this distinction needs to be made, because while the latter concept may 
apply to anything that is not a man seeing a man, like a stone, the former can apply 
only to a man not seeing a man. 
But the above, as I said, is only one of the possible readings of "non homo videns 
hominem". We can also understand this phrase so that the negation is applied only 
to the concept corresponding to the term 'man' in it, like this: 
RAT(2)("non homo videns hominem") = 
RAT(videns)(RAT(non)(RAT(homo)))(RAT(hominem)) (RAT(t)), 
Notice that in accordance with clause (RATamb), these two constructions are 
based on the two different analyses of the same syntactically ambiguous phrase, i.e., 
on the two different ways this complex phrase may be built up from its components 
according to the syntactic rules of our fragment. Using the characteristic functions 
defrned above, we can distinguish these two analyses in the following manner: 
F8(non)(homo videns hominem) = 
Fg(non)(F6(videns) (homo)(hominem)) 




The first of the remaining two clauses assigning a ratio to simple terms is 
(RATadj), which specifies that the concept of an adjective in the neutral gender in 
its capacity to form a standalone term is such that it gets saturated with the concept 
of the quality connoted by this adjective, like the concept of whiteness connoted by 
'album', i.e., the concept signified immediately by the term 'albedo'. 
In a similar manner, the last of this group of clauses specifies that the ratio of an 
ampliative participle of the neutral gender having no complements and ampliating to 
the past, like 'mortuum', gets saturated by the concepts of some past and the present 
time. Actually, this clause is very ad hoc, and is added only for the sake of the term 
'mortuum' in our fragment. But since I think the more general formulations could 
quite easily be given on the basis of the formulations I provide here, I am ready to 
sacrifice generality on the altar of simplicity in this case. 
Because of their semantic diversity, we have four different clauses for complex 
terms formed by participles in the neutral gender with their complements. For the 
first of these we have already seen an example above, with 'videns'. The second 
clause serves to make the semantic distinction between, e.g., "videns omnem 
hominem" and "omnem hominem videns". Clearly, to these complex terms there 
should correspond different concepts. For consider the following sentences: "Videns 
omnem hominem est equus" and "Omnem hominem videns est equus". The first can 
be true only if there is some horse that sees every man, while the latter can be true, 
if every man is seen by some horse or other. But so to these sentences there should 
correspond different mental propositions, which, however can only differ in their 
subjects, which are precisely the concepts signified by our two complex terms 
differing only in word order. 
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Now according to the first clause (RATla), the ratio of "videns omnem hominem" 
is to be constructed as follows: 
RAT("videns omnem hominem") = 
RAT(videns)(RAT(omnem hominem))(RAT(t)) = 
RAT(videns)(RAT(omnem)(RAT(hominem)))(RAT(t)) 
"omnem hominem videns" can be obtained thus: 
RAT("omnem hominem videns") = 
RAT(omnem) (RAT(videns)(RAT(hominem))(RAT(t))) 
As I think already these simple illustrations sufficiently show how the construction 
of complex rationes could be achieved in this system, instead of going into further 
details let me try to round out the picture by some simple schematic indications of 
how the remaining semantic properties of expressions of our fragment could be 
defined and base my concluding remarks on these. 
I hope it is already clear from the foregoing that if all simple rationes building up 
a complex one were syntactically marked and the syntactic construction faithfully 
mirrored the conceptual construction, one simple and elegant clause could do the 
whole job of assigning rationes to complex expressions in the following manner: 
If X=F,(&)(xl) ..(x,J, then RAT(X) = RAT(&)RAT(x,) ... RAT(&). 
Indeed, all the clauses above seem to agree with this general pattern, the only 
reason for their complexity apparently lying in the diversity of the ways different ex- 
pressions in the various syntactic categories of our fragment indicate (or fail to 
indicate) the arity of the concept corresponding to them, and the type of concepts 
this concept requires as its complements. 
On the basis of such a simple clause, also the further semantic values of the 
expressions of our language would be easy to assign, along the lines indicated in the 
prelimiary semiformal discussion. Significata of simple terms should be first 
assigned by free-choice functions of appropriate arity, which could then determine 
the signifcata of complex expressions parallel with the construction of the 
corresponding complex ratio. Significations could then be defrned as appropriate sets 
of significata and connotata, these sets providing suitable identity conditions for the 
rationes of simple categorematic terms. On this basis supposita of simple as well as 
complex terms could be defined as those signifcata of the terms of a proposition 
which are (or were or will be) actual at the time connoted by the copula (or by the 
ampliative terms, if there are any) of the proposition. Of course, to this end separate 
clauses would be needed to determine the effect of syncategorematic, and ampliative 
terms on the supposition of a complex term in which they occur. Finally, on this 
basis a definition of truth could be provided, based on the idea that the truth of an 
affirmative proposition requires the identity of the supposita of its terms. Here again, 
a whole series of separate clauses would be needed to define truth for categorical 
propositions of different quantity, quality and tense. Also, since the quantity of 
oblique terms, depending on word-order influences supposition and truth conditions 
in different ways (identifying different mental propositions as corresponding to the 
sentences in which these oblique terms occur, as we could see), separate clauses 
On the other hand, in accordance with the second clause (RATlb), the ratio of 
\ 
should take care of these different cases as well.u 
But now, instead of going into these details, let us turn to the methodological 
questions raised in the introduction, to reflect on this complexity of the semantic 
theory, arising so unexpectedly for such a simple fragment as we have been 
considering. 
CONCLUSION: SOME METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS 
As I remarked in the previous section, if all simple rationes building up a complex 
one were syntactically marked and the syntactic construction faithfully mirrored the 
conceptual construction, one simple clause could do the job of assigning rationes to 
complex expressions, since in this case, the way complex concepts are built up from 
simple ones could be directly read off from the syntactic construction. Indeed, it is 
precisely this easy identifiability of conceptual structure on the basis of perceptible 
syntactic structure that seems to motivate the construction of artificial languages, to 
develop some direct "conceptual notation", Bep@schrifi, to help the mind's eye in 
discerning the thoughts not so revealed by the syntactic structures of natural 
languages. 
On the other hand, the very idea of the constructibility of a single conceptual 
notation presupposes that there is some uniform conceptual structure, identifiable as 
such lurking behind the various, accidentally developed fasades of natural languages. 
Now despite the apparently Aristotelian origin of this idea, and despite Buridan's 
own avowal of Aristotelianism even in this respect, I think the Buridanian approach 
to semantics presented above suggests a much more intricate and intimate 
relationship between language and thought, determining further the relationship of 
language to reality. 
As the very complexity of the above clauses shows, a natural language, indeed, 
even such a simple fragment of it as presented above, uses various different syntactic 
clues to identrfy concepts in different semantic and syntactic categories. But these 
different clues seem to do even more than just showing various ways to hit upon this 
or that concept, which would be there anyway, whether we have this clue to identify 
it or another. Some concepts owe their very existence to these syntactic clues: 
whence according to this semantic approach, different people using different 
languages must have different conceptual structures operative in their minds, owing 
to the differences in the structure of their languages. For example the idea of 
definiteness (unicity in a certain context) carried uniformly in English by the definite 
article is certainly not so carried in Latin, which lacks articles. So while in a Buri- 
danian semantics for English we probably should have a simple syncategorematic 
concept corresponding to the definite article, the same concept could not occur in 
the Buridanian semantics of Latin. 
23 For a thorough discussion of the problems arising for Buridan's semantics in this regard, see: I!!. 
hrgtr: "Un dCbat mCdiCval sur le concept de sujet d'CnoncC cattgorique: Ctude d'un texte de Jean 
Buridan", in: z. Kaluza-P. Vignaux Preuve et raisons h l ' l l n i v d  de Park: logique, ontologie et theologie 
QU A W  siecle, Paris, 1984. 
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As even these simple considerations show, on the Buridanian approach there is 
no uniform semantics for all natural languages: there are as many different 
semantics, as there are different languages. Indeed, since even users of the same 
idiom may widely differ in their usage, different socio-linguistic communities may 
have further strong claims to autonomous semantics, on account of their specific us- 
age, associated with specific concepts. Buridan himself is perfectly aware of these 
implications of his approach his references to jargon and obligational disputes 
clearly indicate' this.% 
On the other hand, all this semantic and conceptual diversity need not necessarily 
impede communication and understanding between people brought up using 
different idioms. As the concepts of others are not in principle inaccessible, as 
argued above, despite the fact that they are not directly observable, it is possible to 
acquire the concepts of others and develop common concepts between users of 
different languages. In such a case, however, we do not have even those relatively 
safe syntactic clues to the meaning of others as we have with persons speaking our 
own idiom. It is only through cooperation and coexistence, sharing the same form of 
life that our concepts can get so harmonized that we shall be able eventually to 
speak the same language. 
But if this is so, then we may indeed not expect anything so simple and 
perspicuous from a natural language semantics as we are used to in our formal 
semantic studies. However unwieldy and cumbersome the Buridanian approach may 
seem in comparison to, say, a Fregean approach, it probably more faithfully reflects 
the real semantic situation, with all its intricacies, uncertainties and contingencies.z 
Gyula Klima 
Yale University/ 
Institute of Philosophy, 
Budapest, Hungary 
24 For a discussion of this aspect of Buridan's semantics see J. Pinborg: The Summulae, Tractatus I De 
groductionibus", in: J. Pinborg (ed.): The Logic of John Buridan, Copenhagen, 1976. 
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Anonymus Cordubensis, Questiones super primum librum Posteriorum. 
A Partial Edition: Prologue and qq. 1-5 
Costantino Marmo 
1. The anonymous questions on Posterior AnaZytics I, 71a 1-79b 23, are preservec 
in only one ms., Cordoba, Bibl. del Excellentissimo Cabildo, cod.52: ff.80va-100rt 
(C - beginning of the XIVfh cent.).' Two other mss. contain a different version o 
this commentary: Firenze, Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, S.Croce, cod. plut.XI1 sin., 3 
ff.28ra-35ra (F - beginning of the XIVth cent.): and Munchen, Bayerische Staatsbibl. 
Clm 8005: ff.lra-16ra (M - XIVth cent.)? Some of the questions belonging to thi! 
latter version have been edited by Jan Pinborg (Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 17-22; anc 
Pinborg 1973: 49-62). In his introduction to the Leonine edition of Thomas 
exposition on the Posterior Analytics, Ren6-Antoine Gauthier (1989) described thc 
MF version as a rearrangement of the C questions. In what follows, I would like tc 
add some further evidence of this, and to argue that the MF version had probabl! 
also a different author, and to suggest that both of them could have been writter 
before 1277. 
2. Since the text I want to edit is only a part of the whole work (prol. and 99.1 
S), and since M lacks the prologue and the first 6 questions, this ms. will neither bc 
used in the following edition, nor closely examined. Commenting only on Post. An 
I, 71a 1-79b 23, C offers a series of 92 qq. vs. the 78 qq. of the MF version on thc 
same portion of text. I give a comparative table of C questions and MF questions, 
Numbers and Titles (C version) C F M Numb. 
<Prohemiurn: Sicut dicit Aristotiles> 80va 27va - - - 
q. 1: u. logica sit scientia 81ra 27vb - - - 
q. 3: u. logica sit de ente sicut de 
MF vers 
9. 1 
q. 2: u. logica sit scientia communis 81rb 28ra - - - 9. 2 
subiect o 81va 28ra - - - q. 3 
' It is described in Ebbesen 1977: XI-XI1 (cf. also: Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 2-3 
Gauthier 1989: 60*-61*). This edition and that of the Anonymi Philosophia "Sicut dicihlr a/ 
Arktotile. *' were planned to be edited as appendixes to my article in ClMACL 60, 1990. Eve] 
though published now separately, they should be read together with it. For the present editioi 
I am i debted also to Pietro Rossi. ' It is descfibe: in Ebbesen 1977: XI1 (cf. also Ebbesen & Pinborg 1970: 3-5; an( 
Gauthier 1989: 60 -61 ). 
It is described by Pinborg 1973: 48. 
